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Critical Analysis Quine Putman Indispensability Argument Philosophy Do we limit ontological commitments to only things of matter? Here is the how do you write a number question. It is difficult to separate the mathematical from the empirical that many believe are a common language especially in science. We ask ourselves in metaphysics the question of whether we are existentially committed to mathematical objects, claiming as Hilary Whitehall Putnam (1926) and Willard Van Orman Quine (1908-2000), their indispensability to empirical theories. A huge mistake by many philosophers is they do not make the distinction between theory and praxes. There is no empirical data that numbers are real, that is why their existence is still part of metaphysics, if they were proved to university chicago mba essays 2012 real then they would move away from philosophy and become something else, like psychology. For something to be empirical in practice is different from theory. esp for metaphysics. In metaphysics there is no information and there is no established facts, by that I mean there is no information and no facts to be learned besides information and facts about what certain people think, or once thought concerning various metaphysical questions, even Ethics is like this, there is no list of established facts for the student of ethics to learn. If some branches of philosophy were suddenly to undergo a revolutionary transformation and began, as a consequence to yield real information, it would cease to be regarded times uk university ranking 2018 business turbotax a branch of philosophy; instead it would be regarded as one of the sciences. We see this happening with Logic, logic has become less a branch of philosophy and more of pure Mathematics. This is an issue with how I see how people use Quine. Rene Descartes (1596-1650) invented analytical geometry; this was established data and moved to Mathematics. But as we know Descartes philosophy of Mind still has no data even today, although he thought he had established data it is still "wow" out there. Analytical geometry is an indispensible tool of scientific thought till this day. But his philosophy work is considered part of the history of philosophy. What is all this leading too, just this, there may be another approach with possibilities to proving the existence of number, but as of today there is not enough data to prove numbers exist. Quine in his indispensability argument was claiming epistemological superiority, not actualized forms. He couched this in terms of myth. Neopragmatist's would say the assertion that numbers exist is limited to epistemic "thought" that there is a myth that we state, (and has been stated) with terms that are of mathematical reference, hence a useful myth. Quine (1976; 1980a; 1980b; 1981a; 1981c) and Putnam (1979a; 1979b) "have karin engelhardt dortmund university that the indispensability of mathematics to empirical science" (Quine/Putnam) is enough reason to believe in the existence of number, can something be fictional when it is a useful tool in many aspects of science? Clearly this makes good sense but his approach my need a little revising using different possibilities. "According to this line of argument, reference to (or quantification over) mathematical entities such as sets, numbers, functions and such is indispensable to our best scientific theories, and so we ought to be committed to the existence of these mathematical entities. To do otherwise is to be guilty of what Putnam has called "intellectual dishonesty. Moreover, mathematical entities are seen to be on an epistemic par with the other theoretical entities of science, since belief in the existence of the former is justified by the same evidence that confirms the theory as a whole (and hence belief in the latter)" (Putnam 1979b, p. 347). This argument is known as the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument for mathematical realism."(Quine/Putnam). "(P1) We ought to have ontological commitment to all and only the entities great fiction authors are indispensable to our best scientific theories. (P2) Mathematical entities are indispensable to our best scientific theories. (C) We ought to have ontological commitment to mathematical entities." (Standford) Field attacks the second premise, claiming that mathematical objects are not necessary to. scientific theory. I do not feel he did a very job of it. Penelope Maddy attacks the first premise claiming that if mathematical objects are indispensible to science it does not mean we need to make an Ontological commitment. Why not? If we know 2+2=4 without a doubt, is it not a clear truth? Can it be 5? This logical argument is compatible with Quine's naturalistic view "that philosophical enterprise is Continuous with the scientific enterprise."(Quine 1981b). So far this is the best argument for an ontological commitment on numbers, it is very close to data, without embracing Platonism. One argument against Putnam/Quine's indispensability argument is Stephan Yablo, a Nominalist from Massachusetts institute of Technology, in his "Paradox of Existence" pays special attention to the ontological status of numbers as "Platonic objects", contrary to Quine is does not try to use actualized forms in his argument. His argument denies the existence of abstract objects, that abstract objects do not exist in space and time. Here we go from one extreme to the other. Do abstract objects exist? Russian people physical features only things that exist in space or time empirically exist? There is not enough data to prove that numbers do not exist or that they do, as I stated earlier. "What about someone who believes in beautiful things, but doesn't believe in the beautiful itselfâ€¦? Don't you think he is living in a dream rather than a wakened state? (Republic 476c)." If we do consider this then the point some philosophers like Maddy makes the distinction intuitively, where threeness of three things proves numbers exist does not work. That would correspond with Yablos thought. Yablo claims Quines proof is too easy a claim and for that reason is evidence enough that he is incorrect. Sometimes the truth stares us in the face, simplicity, basics such as 2+2=4, is the purest truth, clear understanding too our rationality, logic. Yablo uses analogies and metaphors to argue against an ontological commitment of numbers. Yablo would attack the premise that we ought to be ontologically committed to the abstract entities (nominalist) assumed by our best scientific theories, as a common language. He claims without establishing ontological commitment to numbers, just supposing numbers exist, not showing existence matters, we loose actual meaning. He argues words like "if pigs can fly" are just words without real meaning if their existence is not proven. Experience matters to an ontological commitment. "If experience matters to ontology and ontology matters to truth then Buy research papers online cheap The History of the Olympics ought to matter to truth as well."(Yablo) Again should we really confine what exists to experience and perception? He asserts either numbers exist or they do not. "Either the counter models exist, or they do not."(Yablo) Maybe they do exist but not in the way Yablo believes things must exist in, there are other possibilities and explanations. Quine as I said does not assert forms. He claims "either tomorrow's sea battle awaits us or it doesn't", lets examine that a moment, actually it is possible, slightly a sea battle could happen tomorrow, Israel How do we write a good business case? expected on Yom Kipur the Syrian army to come marching over the Golan, but they did. Maybe I am off topic but his statement seems too black and white to me, he doesn't take into account possibilities. Just as "Descartes, Leibniz, Kant proposed that mathematics is the science of the possible, while physics is the science of existing things. Not all possibilities are realities." (Arthur Collins) Another argument against Putnam/Quine's indispensability argument is Jody Azzouni, holism, he claims with his use of thin and thick epistemic access, proves that Quine's argument that numbers exist because they are an essential tool to science is not enough to prove their existence. Azzouni does not claim that numbers do not exist, as I said there is not enough data to prove that they do or do not, but he does use a holistic approach in trying to argue that Quine's argument is not enough prove that times uk university ranking 2018 business turbotax do. This approach is not a bad approach depending on how you make the thick/thin distinction. Azzouni's distinction goes like this; thick epistemic access is criteria for existential commitment; mathematical objects are crisply divided from empirical ones they simply do not exist on this view."(Azzouni) Azzouni uses his thick epistemic criteria when he claims numbers are illusionary due to they do not hold his four epistemic properties," robustness, refinability, tracking, and explanation of epistemic access to certain posits. He claims in order to achieve a thick epistemic access the object must have observational qualities that lead to other qualities or properties under the surface. According to Azzouni only those things which can achieve thick epistemic access are able to have an ontological commitment. Azzouni like Quine does not try to make a analytic/synthetic distinction, he does not try to prove numbers do not exist, he argues "that a need to qualify over mathematical objects in Commentary on The Night of the Hunter Film context of a scientific theory that we take to be true, is no reason, by itself, to think that such items exist" (Azzouni) Again the distinction between praxes and theories. "Do numbers exist?" Are they a Myth? Let's look at Arthur W. Collins argument, to analyze the possibility of revising Quine's argument. Realists believe that numbers exist, whereas nominalism believes they do not. Let's put aside these debates of realists and nominalists and ontological commitment to consider Collins short argument. Collin's approaches this differently, he claims "since we know that 4' is the positive square root of 16 is true, there must be numbers. There are four prime numbers smaller than 8. If we know this then we know that numbers exist because the proposition we know is that some prime numbers exist. I karin engelhardt dortmund university this the short argument for the existence of numbers."(Collins) "Quine couches numbers as a myth, a useful myth, but if we come to believe something exists we then do not call it a myth" (Collins). Azzouni is correct in that observable object do have thick epistemic access, physical objects are superior due to experience. Should we confine ontological commitment to only physical objects as Yablo would have us do? With intuition, we can rationally give properties to numbers. Properties such as numbers are "non physical, non spatial, non temporal, non corruptible, non perceivable, non contingent, non empirical, and they do not enter into causal relationships. The existence of the square root of 16 is proved, and no number breaking news syria airstrikes university than 4 can possibly by the positive square root of 16."(Collins) Collins refers to a description of possibilities and knowledge of assertions. Collin asserts numerical truths require the existence of numbers. The claim is not whether numbers exist or do not exist in this paper, it is that we must explore all possibilities and so far there is not enough data to be sure if they do. Article name: Critical Analysis Quine Putman Indispensability Argument Philosophy essay, research paper, dissertation.